Replication Data for: The fiscal benefits of repeated cooperation: coalitions and debt dynamics in 36 democracies

Do coalition governments really suffer from short time horizons in fiscal policy-making, as posited by standard political economy models? This article focuses on coalitions which have created high levels of familiarity through shared governing experience in the past and which are likely to cooperate again in future governing coalitions. I argue that such coalitions have incentives to internalize the future costs of debt accumulation and reach credible agreements to balance their constituencies’ fiscal preferences. Moreover, sustaining broad coalitions should have electoral advantages to implementing controversial economic reforms, thus resulting with lower debt increases compared not only to less durable coalitions, but also to single-party governments. Comparing 36 OECD/EU democracies between (up to) 1962 and 2013, I estimate the effects of coalitions’ cooperation prospects on the dynamics of public debt. The findings indicate that long time horizons can help coalitions to overcome intertemporal coordination problems and to reach specific policy goals.联合政府在财政政策制定过程中，是否真如标准政治经济学模型所假设的那样，普遍存在较短的时间视野？本文聚焦于那些凭借过往共同执政经历形成高度执政默契，且未来有望再度组建执政联盟的联合政府。笔者认为，此类联合政府具备将债务积累的未来成本内部化的动机，并能够达成可信协议，以平衡其各选区的财政政策偏好。此外，维系广泛执政联盟相较于推行争议性经济改革，更具选举优势，因此其债务增幅不仅低于存续时长更短的联合政府，甚至低于一党制政府。通过对1962年至2013年（最早可追溯至1962年）间36个经合组织（OECD）/欧盟民主国家开展比较研究，本文估算了联合政府的合作前景对公共债务动态的影响。研究结果表明，较长的时间视野能够帮助联合政府克服跨期协调难题，进而达成特定的政策目标。