Data for: Efficient informal trade: Theory and experimental evidence from the Cape Town taxi market

Abstract of associated article: Informal sectors in developing countries are often thought of as responses to rigid and cumbersome market regulations. In this paper I study informal trade as a first-best outcome. In the model I propose rigid regulations can be necessary to achieve efficiency even though they are always sidestepped. The key assumption is that the regulations define the trading parties' fall-back position in case the informal bargaining process breaks down. I set up a field experiment to test the model's mechanisms in the Cape Town market for metered taxis. Consistent with the model, I find that sidestepping the regulations increase cost efficiency (taxis take the shortest route). The price is however unaffected, suggesting informal bargaining leads to a Pareto improvement.相关论文摘要：发展中国家的非正规部门常被视作应对严苛冗杂的市场监管的产物。本文将非正规贸易作为第一优结果展开研究。在本文提出的模型中，即便监管始终被规避，严苛的市场监管仍可能是实现效率的必要条件。核心假设为：监管条款界定了交易双方在非正规议价流程破裂时的保留议价地位。本文在开普敦计价出租车市场开展田野实验，以检验模型中的作用机制。研究结果与模型预测一致：规避监管可提升成本效率（出租车能够选择最短通行路径），但并未对价格造成影响，这表明非正规议价实现了帕累托改进。