Human Imagination and Animal Imagination: A Comparative Ontological Study in Light of the A-B.F-N Model

This research proceeds from a well-established scientific premise acknowledging the existence of imaginative and intelligent capacities in living organisms, based on recent studies such as the bonobo Kanzi study (Science, 2026). However, the core objective is to provide a precise ontological distinction between animal imagination, linked to need and survival (B), and human imagination, which combines need (B) with ethical awareness and existential development (F). Drawing on the A-B.F-N model, we demonstrate that human foundational imagination the capacity to envision what has not occurred, create new worlds, and reflect on moral possibilities is an expression of internal sovereignty (F), indeed an integral part of F itself. Animal imagination, by contrast, remains confined to functional processing (B) tied to sensory experience, memory, and past events, even when it appears innovative or social. We present empirical evidence from dissociative states (sleep-related eating disorder, sleep paralysis, distracted driving) demonstrating that B and F are functionally separable, constituting a triple proof of the potential dissociation of sovereignty from the body. We also discuss time perception as a conscious phenomenon (F) that distinguishes humans from animals. Furthermore, we introduce a methodology for measuring the manifestations of F i.e., the force of the wind, not the wind itself through the Sovereign Integration Index (SII) and brain network analysis, based on the study by Wilcox et al. (2026) in Nature Communications. We discuss the states in which B dominates F, making human behavior resemble animal patterns, as manifested in the conflict between core (offspring) and branch (siblings) and stranger a deep biological drive (B) shared between humans and animals. Conversely, when F dominates, ethical responsibility, conscience, and sacrifice emerge. Finally, we apply the model to artificial intelligence, demonstrating that it is a pure B system (Bₐ) simulating F outputs but lacking consciousness and existential experience, which necessitates maintaining human veto power as an ethical safeguard.