Data for: Social preferences and voting on reform: An experimental study

Abstract of associated article: Debating over efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms accounts for the routine business of democratic institutions. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) hold that anti-reform bias can be attributed to individual-specific uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses resulting from a reform. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate that anti-reform bias arising from uncertainty is mitigated by social preferences. We show that, paradoxically, many who stand to lose from reforms vote in favor because they value efficiency, while many who will potentially gain from reforms oppose them due to inequality aversion.关联论文摘要：围绕提升效率却加剧不平等的改革展开辩论，乃是民主制度的日常议事事项。费尔南德斯与罗德里克（Fernandez and Rodrik，1991）指出，反改革偏见可归因于个体对改革引发的损益分配存在个体特异性的不确定性。本文通过实验证实，由不确定性引发的反改革偏见会因社会偏好（social preferences）而得到缓解。研究结果颇具矛盾性：诸多本会因改革受损的群体因重视效率而投下赞成票，而诸多有望从改革中获益的群体却因不平等厌恶（inequality aversion）而反对改革。