Data from: Social costs enforce honesty of a dynamic signal of motivation

Understanding the processes that promote signal reliability may provide important insights into the evolution of diverse signaling strategies among species. The signals that animals use to communicate must comprise mechanisms that prohibit or punish dishonesty, and social costs of dishonesty have been demonstrated for several fixed morphological signals (e.g. color badges of birds and wasps). The costs maintaining the honesty of dynamic signals, which are more flexible and potentially cheatable, are unknown. Using an experimental manipulation of the dynamic visual signals used by male veiled chameleons (Chamaeleo calyptratus) during aggressive interactions, we tested the idea that the honesty of rapid color change signals is maintained by social costs. Our results reveal that social costs are an important mechanism maintaining the honesty of these dynamic color signals − 'dishonest' chameleons whose experimentally manipulated coloration was incongruent with their contest behavior received more physical aggression than 'honest' individuals. This is the first demonstration that the honesty of a dynamic signal of motivation − physiological color change − can be maintained by the social costliness of dishonesty. Behavioral responses of signal receivers, irrespective of any specific detection mechanisms, therefore prevent chameleon cheaters from prospering.探究提升信号可靠性的相关机制，可为解析物种间多样通信信号策略的演化历程提供关键洞见。动物用以通信的信号，必须具备抑制或惩罚欺骗行为的机制；此前已有多项研究证实，部分固定形态信号（如鸟类与胡蜂的色斑标识）存在欺骗行为带来的社会成本。但对于更具灵活性且潜在可被欺骗的动态信号而言，维持其诚实性的成本机制仍未明确。本研究通过对雄性盔避役（Chamaeleo calyptratus）在争斗互动中使用的动态视觉信号进行实验操控，验证了快速体色变化信号的诚实性可由社会成本维持这一假说。研究结果显示，社会成本是维持这类动态体色信号诚实性的重要机制——经实验操控使其体色与争斗行为不符的“不诚实”避役，相较于“诚实”个体，遭受了更多的肢体攻击。本研究首次证实，动机类动态信号（生理体色变化）的诚实性，可通过欺骗行为带来的社会成本得以维持。综上，信号接收者的行为响应，无需依赖特定的识别机制，即可阻止欺骗性避役得逞。