OPPORTUNISM AND THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVES: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALISYS BASED ON GAME THEORY

This data set shows the result of an ab experiment based on game theory. We conducted a laboratory experiment based on game theory, using a modified version of the ultimatum game, where proposers had the opportunity to manipulate the responder’s beliefs by the use of “hide behind the small cake” strategy. Our experiment took advantage of the fact that Proposers were informed about the initial endowment, while Respondents were not. In our experiment, the Proposer had the opportunity to deceive by making their offer appear fairer than it really was and without incurring any penalty. The Respondent was only aware of the probability of each possible endowment, which were, in Brazilian Reais: $10 with 0.5 probability; $20 with 0.25 probability; $30 with 0.25 probability. We use the higher probability of a $10 endowment in order to create more opportunities for the Proposer to incur in opportunism if he/she wanted to. Bearing in mind that the Respondent had the power of rejection in the game, self-regarding Proposer would want the Respondent to believe that the size of the pie was equal to $10, the lowest amount in the game. Thus, we investigated the “hide behind a small cake effect” using an ultimatum game framework with imperfect information.本数据集呈现了一项基于博弈论的AB实验结果。我们开展了一项基于博弈论的实验室实验，采用经过改进的最后通牒博弈（ultimatum game）框架，其中提议者（proposer）可通过“躲在小蛋糕背后”策略操控回应者（responder）的信念。本实验利用了如下设定：提议者知晓初始禀赋（endowment），而回应者对此毫不知情。在本实验中，提议者可通过令自身出价看起来比实际更公平的方式实施欺骗，且不会遭受任何惩罚。回应者仅知晓各类可能禀赋的发生概率，以巴西雷亚尔计价的各类禀赋及其对应概率分别为：10雷亚尔（概率0.5）、20雷亚尔（概率0.25）、30雷亚尔（概率0.25）。我们设置了更高概率的10雷亚尔禀赋，以便在提议者存在投机动机时，为其提供更多实施机会主义行为的空间。考虑到回应者在博弈中拥有否决权，自利型提议者会希望让回应者相信“博弈总饼额”为10雷亚尔——即本次实验中的最低总金额。因此，我们借助不完全信息的最后通牒博弈框架，对“躲在小蛋糕背后效应”展开了研究。