Justice and Prosocial Commitments

It is a widespread opinion among philosophers and psychologists that altruistic acts are motivated by charitable love or sympathy toward the needy (Bloom, 1981; Hoffman, 1981; Staub, 1978). Of course, altruism might be deined by just this kind of motivation. However, we also know of helpful concern for others in fulillment of obligations set by social or personal norms. Staub (1978) has distinguished between two types of prosocial goals: prosocial orientation and orientation toward duty and obligation. Rushton (1981) has distinguished between empathic and normative altruism. The present study focuses on one category of normative altruism: prosocial commitments motivated by perceived injustice and aimed at removing injustice. The thesis of this chapter is that when we perceive people who suffer misery and needs that seem undeserved we will be motivated to restitute justice. Prosocial activities in their favor are one way to attempt this. Of course, there are alternative ways to reestablish justice. One alternative may be to reinterpret the misery of the needy as deserved or as self-inflicted: These appraisals, subjectively, cancel injustice. Another way could be to blame and to punish those who are responsible for the misery unknown unknown