Data for: A simple model of the commercial lobbying industry

Abstract of associated article: In this paper we present a model of the behavior of commercial lobbying firms (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D.C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups, commercial lobbying firms represent a variety of clients and are not directly affected by policy outcomes. They are hired by citizens, or groups of citizens, to act as intermediaries on their behalf with policymakers. In our analysis we address two basic questions: what tasks are commercial lobbying firms performing, and what are the implications of their existence for social welfare? We answer the first part of this question by proposing that commercial lobbying firms possess a verification technology that allows them to improve the quality of information concerning the social desirability of policy proposals. This gives policymakers the incentive to allocate their scarce time to commercial lobbying firms. Essentially, it is this access to policymakers that commercial lobbying firms sell to their clients. To address the question of social welfare we construct a simple general equilibrium model that includes commercial lobbying firms, and compare the equilibrium obtained under market provision of lobbying services to the first best optimum. We find that the market level of lobbying services can be socially either too large or too small, and characterize when each will be the case.关联论文摘要：本文提出了商业游说公司（commercial lobbying firms）的行为模型，此类公司涵盖华盛顿特区所谓的K街游说者（K-Street lobbyists）。与传统特殊利益集团（special interest groups）不同，商业游说公司服务于多元客户群体，且不会直接受到政策结果的影响。它们受公民或公民团体委托，作为其与政策制定者（policymakers）之间的中介开展活动。 本研究围绕两个核心问题展开分析：商业游说公司具体承担哪些工作职能？其存在对社会福利会产生何种影响？针对第一个问题，本文提出商业游说公司具备一项验证技术，可提升政策提案社会合意性相关信息的质量。这使得政策制定者有动机将自身稀缺的时间资源分配给商业游说公司。本质上，商业游说公司向客户售卖的正是这种对接政策制定者的渠道资源。 为解答社会福利相关问题，本文构建了包含商业游说公司的简易一般均衡模型，并将游说服务市场供给下的均衡结果与第一优最优解进行对比。研究发现，游说服务的市场供给规模在社会层面可能出现过剩或不足的情况，本文同时刻画了两种情形各自的发生条件。