Replication data for: Constitutional Borrowing and Nonborrowing

Constitutional borrowing comes in different forms. Judges may consider decisions reached by their counterparts in other societies when resolving disputes; constitutional framers may look abroad when considering what provisions to etch into their documents; even citizens may be attentive to practices elsewhere when formulating opinions over constitutional change. Perhaps not so surprisingly, the scholarly literature reflects this variation. Numerous studies have focused on borrowing as it pertains to constitutional design; others have set their sights on the export and import of decisions (or their underlying rationale) rendered by courts, or what some scholars and judges are now deeming, more broadly, an international judicial \"dialogue\" or \"conversation.\" A handful are empirical efforts, not so much geared at explaining borrowings but r ather at describing when and where they have occurred. Others are largely or mostly normative in nature, asking whether courts should canvass international and comparative law when interpreting their society's constitutional documents, how to judge \"when a borrowing or importation is successful,\" or \"whether American democracy be exported to [particular] societies,\" among others. The bulk of essays, though, are a combination, invoking empirical arguments to shore up their normative points—such as offering the positive empirical implications of adopting their preferred position (e.g., either for or against borrowing). While we appreciate all these distinctions, in our view they under appreciate a key point; namely, that constitutional borrowing is a case of a larger phenomenon: institutional design. When constitutional courts choose (or do not chose) to engage in dialogues with other tribunals, or when the framers of constitutions borrow (or not) provisions from documents elsewhere, they are to be sure engaging (or not) in constitutional borrowing, but their task—to design institutions to gove rn their societies—is far larger than most scholars have taken that term to mean. We understand why this point remains underdeveloped in existing literature. The problem, as our emphasis above on or not implies, is that many studies of constitutional borrowing (especially the great many that rely on, in part or in full, empirical evidence) select on the dependent variable, that is, they typically focus on when the phenomenon occurs—when and why society B borrows a formal constitutional provision, a court precedent, and so on from society A—and ignore when and why it does not occur—when and why society B does not borrow a formal constitutional provision, a court precedent, and so on from society A. This practice is problematic for many reasons but most relevant here is that it moves us away from a crucial feature of the phenomenon we are seeking to describe or explain: that societies are making (or have made) choices over whether to borrow (or not borrow) institutions from another or other societies. They are not merely, reflexively, or always borrowing, as the practice of selecting on the dependent variable might lead us to conclude; they are rather engaged in the task of designing institutions. Sometimes, in undertaking that task, they borrow from society B; sometimes, they borrow from society C; sometimes they do not borrow at all.宪法借鉴（constitutional borrowing）存在多种表现形式。法官在裁判纠纷时，可参考其他法域同类司法主体作出的裁决；制宪者在拟定宪法文本条款时，亦可借鉴域外经验；甚至普通民众在就宪法修改形成观点时，也会关注他国的相关实践。学界相关研究亦体现出这一差异，这一点并不足为奇。诸多研究聚焦于与宪法设计相关的借鉴行为；另有部分研究关注法院裁判（或其背后的法理依据）的输出与引入，或是部分学者与法官如今更宽泛地称之为国际司法"对话"或"交流"的现象。少数研究属于实证分析范畴，其核心并非阐释宪法借鉴的动因，而是描述该行为发生的时机与场景。其余多数研究则以规范主义分析为主，探讨的议题包括：法院在解释本国宪法文本时，是否应当援引国际法与比较法规则？如何判断"一项借鉴或引入行为是否成功"？以及"美国民主是否应当输出至特定国家"等等。不过，大部分研究则兼具两类属性，通过实证论据支撑其规范主义主张——例如，论证采纳其偏好立场（无论是支持还是反对宪法借鉴）所带来的积极实证效应。尽管我们认可上述分类的合理性，但我们认为，现有研究均低估了一个核心要点：宪法借鉴本质上是制度设计（institutional design）这一更宏大现象的子集。当宪法法院选择（或不选择）与其他审判机构开展对话，或是制宪者决定（或不决定）从他国宪法文本中借鉴条款时，诚然，这属于宪法借鉴行为，但其核心任务——构建治理本国社会的制度体系——远比大多数学者对"宪法借鉴"一词的界定更为宽泛。我们理解为何该要点在现有文献中尚未得到充分探讨。正如我们前文论述所隐含的，诸多宪法借鉴相关研究（尤其是大量部分或完全依赖实证证据的研究）均存在因变量（dependent variable）选择性偏误的问题：这类研究通常仅关注该现象发生的场景——即B社会何时、为何会从A社会借鉴正式宪法条款、法院先例等——却忽略了该现象未发生的场景：即B社会何时、为何不会从A社会借鉴正式宪法条款、法院先例等。这种研究范式存在诸多问题，其中与本文主题最相关的一点是：它偏离了我们试图阐释与描述的该现象的核心特征——即各国社会一直在（或已经）在是否借鉴他国制度这一问题上做出选择。正如因变量选择性偏误的研究范式可能会让我们得出的结论那样，各国并非不假思索地、习惯性地持续开展借鉴行为；相反，它们始终在推进制度构建的工作：有时会借鉴B社会的制度，有时会借鉴C社会的制度，有时则完全不进行任何借鉴。