Replication data for: Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict

Students of international politics have often argued that state leaders initiate the use of force internationally to divert attention away from domestic problems. The author contends that these arguments concerning the relationship between domestic unrest and international conflict are not supported empirically because they focus too narrowly on the incentives state leaders have to use external force as a diversionary tactic without considering alternative solutions to quieting domestic unrest. It is hypothesized that democratic leaders will respond to domestic unrest by diverting attention by using force internationally. On the other hand, authoritarian leaders are expected to repress the unrest directly, and these acts of repression will make them less likely to use force internationally. An analysis of the initiation of force by the challenging states in 180 international crises between 1948 and 1982 strongly supports these hypotheses. The results of the analyses and their implications for the literature on diversionary conflicts and the rapidly growing literature on democratic peace are discussed.国际政治领域的学者常提出，国家领导人会主动发起国际武力行动，以转移国内民众对本土问题的关注。本文作者则指出，这类关于国内动荡与国际冲突间关联的论断并未获得实证支撑——因其研究视角过于狭隘，仅聚焦于国家领导人将外部武力作为转移注意力策略的动机，却未考虑平息国内动荡的其他可行方案。本研究提出如下假说：民主国家领导人在遭遇国内动荡时，会通过发起国际武力行动转移民众注意力；与之相对，威权国家领导人则会直接镇压国内动荡，而这类镇压行为会降低其发起国际武力行动的可能性。通过对1948年至1982年间180起国际危机中争端挑战国（challenging states）的武力发起行为进行分析，本研究的假说得到了有力验证。本文最后讨论了上述分析结果，以及其对转移型冲突（diversionary conflicts）相关研究与快速发展的民主和平论（democratic peace）研究领域的启示。