Considering concessions: A survey experiment on the Colombian peace process (Replication Data)

Designing peace agreements that can be signed and sustained can be difficult in civil conflict. Many recent cases of successful settlements include electoral provisions, often for rebel groups to participate as political parties. Engaging the electoral process, however, can also open the peace process to the population at large, potentially derailing a settlement or some of its provisions, perhaps especially those related to politics. In this paper, we examine popular support for peace processes, specific electoral provisions, and potential concessions that provide former rebels with protections, legitimacy, and power. Using a survey experiment in Colombia, we find that the peace process overall is more popular than its electoral provisions, and that rebel endorsement of the provisions further diminishes support. These results contribute to an explanation of why the 2016 Colombian plebiscite on the peace agreement failed and to an understanding of how design matters to agreement effectiveness.在内战情境下，设计可签署并得以持续的和平协定往往颇具挑战。近期诸多成功的和解案例均纳入选举条款，通常允许反叛团体以政党身份参与政治活动。然而，参与选举进程也可能使和平进程向全体民众开放，进而有可能破坏整个和解协定或其中部分条款，尤其是与政治相关的条款。本研究旨在考察民众对和平进程、特定选举条款，以及为前反叛团体提供保护、合法性与权力的潜在让步的支持度。通过在哥伦比亚开展的调查实验，我们发现：整体而言，民众对和平进程的支持度高于其对相关选举条款的支持，且反叛团体对这些条款的背书会进一步削弱民众的支持。本研究结果有助于解释2016年哥伦比亚和平协定全民公投失败的原因，同时也能增进人们对“协定设计如何影响和平协定生效效果”这一问题的理解。