Adjustment of Foreign Policy Preferences in Exile: Resocialization and Attitudes Toward Iran among Russian Migrants in Armenia

Do migrants adjust their foreign policy preferences after settling in a host society? If so, why, and under what circumstances does such adjustment occur? Migration entails entry into a new social and political environment, often requiring a shift from the norms of the sending society (or specific segments of it) toward the expectations of the host society (Waldinger, 2007; Hochschild & Mollenkopf, 2009). Yet our understanding of how migrants—especially those who hold anti-war views and who do not support their home country’s policies—adapt their foreign policy preferences, particularly in host countries with contested geopolitical alignments, remains limited.

The theoretical framework of this study draws on several strands of research. Studies of public opinion on foreign policy emphasize the interaction between relatively stable predispositions and two types of cues: elite and social cues. Classical accounts of foreign policy attitudes often portray citizens as weakly informed and reliant on elite guidance (Almond, 1950; Lippmann, 1955). However, more recent work demonstrates that individuals frequently possess structured foreign-policy orientations rooted in identity, moral evaluations, and geopolitical alignments (Kertzer, 2023). Such attitudes may therefore exhibit substantial rigidity, particularly when formed in contexts of intense political conflict such as the Russia–Ukraine war.

At the same time, both research on political attitudes formation and studies of social influence and political (re)socialization suggests that expressed attitudes are shaped not only by prior beliefs or elite opinion but also by the environment in which individuals operate (Bilodeau et al., 2010; Bilodeau & Dumouchel, 2023; Krawatzek & Sasse, 2022). Individuals frequently adapt their expressed political preferences in response to perceived social expectations, reputational incentives, and group cues (Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017). This mechanism is particularly relevant in migratory contexts, where individuals transition between political environments and encounter new dominant narratives about international alliances and threats. In such settings, attitude expression may reflect not only persuasion or genuine preference change but also strategic alignment with host-society norms. Group cues—from peers, migrant networks, and local communities—can be as influential as elite signals in shaping political orientations, especially when migrants confront fragmented or ambiguous elite cues from both home and host countries. This dynamic is particularly relevant in the context of the present study, given the specific composition of the migrant population under investigation.

The population under investigation is not intended to be representative of the broader population of the sending country. Rather, it consists of individuals who have chosen to migrate after the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war and who, by virtue of this decision, tend to share broadly similar political orientations. Migration under these circumstances is itself a form of political selection: individuals who left are disproportionately likely to hold anti-war positions and to reject the foreign policy course pursued by their home government. This produces a relatively homogeneous baseline in terms of geopolitical outlook and normative evaluations of the war. While such homogeneity limits the ability to analyze variation along some dimensions, it creates a useful setting for examining how attitudes evolve when individuals with broadly aligned prior beliefs encounter a new political and social environment.

This relative uniformity likely extends to partisan orientations as well. Many migrants in this context define their political identities primarily in opposition to the ruling elites of the sending country, reducing the relevance of traditional partisan cues. As a result, elite signaling may be weaker or more fragmented than in standard models of foreign policy opinion formation. It is often unclear which elites migrants should treat as authoritative sources: the political elites of the home country whose policies they reject, opposition elites from the sending country who may operate in exile, or the political elites of the host country whose geopolitical priorities may differ from both. Under these conditions, elite cues may be diffuse and less influential. By contrast, group cues are likely to become more consequential as migrants embed themselves in the social and institutional environment of the host society. Interaction with local communities, peer networks, and migrant circles may therefore provide the primary reference points shaping how foreign policy attitudes are expressed and potentially adjusted over time. This raises a key question about whether such group cues are sufficient to shift deeply held pre-migration preferences in high-stakes geopolitical contexts.

This study examines the stability versus malleability of foreign policy attitudes among post-2022 Russian migrants in geopolitically contested host states, such as Armenia. The central tension is whether pre-migration geopolitical commitments persist across borders or are re-evaluated when migrants are exposed to new alliance structures, security narratives, and normative environments. In the Armenian context, these complexities are particularly pronounced, as migrants encounter a geopolitical environment in which key external actors—such as Iran—occupy ambiguous positions, being associated both with Russia’s war in Ukraine and with Armenia’s regional security and economic ties. Such ambiguity creates conditions in which host-society group cues may play a decisive role in shaping how these actors are evaluated. The research puzzle arises from the interplay between strongly held prior beliefs and high-stakes host-country political contexts, where foreign policy is central to political conflict rather than peripheral.

Sample size: ~1080