Replication Data for: Legalization and Compliance: How Judicial Activity Undercuts the Global Trade Regime

The crisis facing the World Trade Organization illustrates the trade-off between legalization and compliance in international legal systems. Dispute bodies can sometimes 'over-reach' in their rulings, leading to resistance from member states. This paper looks at one form of legal over-reach: the extension of legal precedent. We argue that extending previous decisions can reduce the flexibility that states include deliberately in their agreements. We utilize original data on individual applications of precedent in Appellate Body decisions from 1995-2015 and on policy responses to those decisions. We find strong evidence that extending precedent reduces on-time compliance. It also leads to longer delays before members comply. The results speak to the life cycles of international organizations as well as questions of design and cooperation.

世界贸易组织（World Trade Organization）当前面临的危机，凸显了国际法律体系中法治化与合规性之间的权衡取舍。争端解决机构有时会在裁决中出现越权行为，进而遭到成员国的抵制。本文聚焦于法律越权的一种具体形式：法律先例的扩张适用。我们认为，扩张既往裁决的适用范围，会削弱成员国在协定中特意预留的灵活性空间。我们采用了1995年至2015年间世界贸易组织上诉机构（Appellate Body）裁决中先例适用的原始数据，以及各成员国针对此类裁决的政策响应数据。我们的研究发现了充分证据，表明先例的扩张适用会降低成员国的按时合规率，同时还会延长成员国完成合规所需的时间周期。本研究结果既关乎国际组织的生命周期演进，也涉及国际组织的制度设计与国际合作相关议题。