Replication Data for: Local Partisan Biases in Allocations of Foreign Aid: A Study of Agricultural Assistance in India

This paper elaborates a theory about why a particular form of bias, based on partisan affiliations, can affect where aid goes and whether the goals of aid are met. Party networks can facilitate coordination of decisions and leverage bureaucratic capacity, but also ensure resources such as aid stay in control of co-partisans to boost reelection goals. Our empirical analysis evaluates whether partisan bias is evident in the locations and impact of World Bank agricultural aid to India, using geo-referenced data on aid projects, election results, and cropland coverage at the level of both state parliamentary electoral constituencies and administrative districts from 1995 to 2008.本文系统阐释了一种基于政党派系从属关系的特定偏见形式，该偏见何以影响援助资金的流向与援助目标的达成。政党网络既能够促进决策协调、强化行政官僚体系的执行能力，同时还可确保援助等资源始终掌控在同党派人士手中，以助力连任竞选目标的实现。本文的实证分析以1995至2008年间的援助项目地理参考数据、选举结果数据，以及邦议会选举选区与行政区层面的耕地覆盖数据为基础，旨在检验针对印度的世界银行（World Bank）农业援助项目的选址与实施效果中是否存在党派偏见。