Domestic Institutions and Wartime Casualties

Military leaders, policymakers, and academics have long debated the relative merits of volunteer versus conscript armies. They also have studied the possible effects of eroding resolve among mass publics in democratic states during wartime. In this paper, we use battlefield casualty data from the population of interstate wars to compare theories of property takings and domestic institutions. We find conscription, like other non-market-based property takings, to be a wasteful means of mobilizing military manpower. Volunteer armies suffer far fewer casualties than their conscripted counterparts. We also find that this effect compounds when interacted with regime type. Volunteer democratic armies suffer especially few casualties. Finally, we find that democratic societies are willing to bear the costs of large-scale commitments to maintaining state sovereignty and survival when targeted by authoritarian states, at times in the face of certain defeat.长期以来，军事将领、政策制定者与学者始终围绕志愿兵役制与征兵制的相对优劣展开激烈辩论。与此同时，他们也针对民主国家民众在战时的意志衰退可能产生的影响展开了研究。本文采用覆盖所有国家间战争的战场伤亡数据，对财产征用理论与国内制度相关理论进行对比分析。研究结果表明，与其他非市场导向的财产征用手段一样，征兵是一种低效的军事人力动员方式；志愿兵役制军队的伤亡规模远低于征兵制军队。进一步研究发现，该效应会随政权类型的不同产生交互放大作用：实行志愿兵役制的民主国家军队，其伤亡率尤其低下。此外，我们还发现，当遭到专制国家攻击时，民主社会愿意承担起大规模维护国家主权与存续的成本，即便有时需直面必然战败的局面。