Replication data for: Dynamic Agenda-setting on the United States Supreme Court: an Empirical Assessment

Because agenda setting is one of the most important activities undertaken by Supreme Court justices, it is hardly surprising to find a rather large body of literature devoted to how they go about performing this task. What is surprising is that the bulk of the agenda-setting literature views the justices in isolation, establishing their own policy priorities with little attention to the preferences and likely actions of actors in other political institutions. Based on a strategic account of agenda setting, we call for a reexamination of this position. Specifically, we argue that Supreme Court justices may be attentive to the preferences and likely actions of members of other political institutions when they go about establishing their agendas, if they hope to maximize their preferences. Because our findings support this claim, we conclude that studies of Court agenda setting, which do not take account of constraints imposed by actors in other institutions, may ignore the realities of the American separation of powers system.议程设置（agenda setting）是美国最高法院大法官最为核心的履职活动之一，因此学界涌现出大量探讨其开展该工作路径的学术文献，这一点不足为奇。令人意外的是，绝大多数议程设置相关研究均孤立地审视大法官的行为，认为其可自行确立政策优先级，却极少关注其他政治机构成员的偏好与潜在行动。基于议程设置的战略分析视角，本文呼吁重新审视这一研究立场。具体而言，本文主张：若最高法院大法官希望最大化自身的政策偏好，那么在设定工作议程时，理应留意其他政治机构成员的偏好与可能采取的行动。鉴于本文的研究结果印证了这一论断，我们最终得出结论：未考虑其他政治机构行为者所施加约束条件的最高法院议程设置研究，或忽视了美国分权制度的运行现实。