Data and Code for: Does Disappointment Aversion Explain Non-Truthful Reporting in Strategy-Proof Mechanisms?
收藏ICPSR2024-01-01 更新2026-04-16 收录
下载链接：
https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/189301/version/V5/view
下载链接
链接失效反馈官方服务：
资源简介：
Disappointment aversion has been suggested as an explanation for non-truthful rankings in strategy-proof school-choice matching mechanisms. We test this hypothesis using a novel experimental design that eliminates important alternative causes of non-truthful rankings. The design uses a simple contingent choice task with only two possible outcomes. Between two treatments, we manipulate the possibility for disappointment aversion to have an effect on ranking. We find a small and statistically marginally significant treatment effect in the direction predicted by disappointment aversion. We therefore conclude that disappointment aversion is a minor contributor to non-truthful rankings in strategy-proof school-choice matching mechanisms.<br>
提供机构：
Chair of Microeconomics, RWTH Aachen, Germany
创建时间：
2024-01-01
