Replication Data for: Burden Sharing in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Who Deploys to Violent Locations?

Which countries deploy troops to violent locations within UN peacekeeping operations? Troop contributing countries face different incentives to participate in peacekeeping operations. These motivating factors should also condition their willingness to take on risks to implement mission mandates. I argue that states motivated to ensure the effectiveness of an operation as well as states that expect to receive private gains by deploying to riskier locales within missions will send more of their troops to these areas. In contrast, states with leaders that are more sensitive to the potential costs associated with riskier commitments will be less willing to send their service members to violent locations. Results from an analysis of spatially disaggregated data across 23 UN missions from 1994 to 2015 support these expectations. States hosting refugees from a mission location tend to deploy more troops to local areas that experience major violent episodes. States that generate greater benefits to their militaries through their involvement in peacekeeping also provide more troops to these areas. In contrast, democratic contributors send fewer troops to violent locations. The results further reveal important disparities in troop deployments within UN peacekeeping operations.

哪些国家会向联合国维和行动中的暴力区域部署部队？出兵国参与维和行动的动因存在差异，而这些激励因素亦会影响其承担风险以执行任务授权的意愿。本文提出，旨在保障行动有效性的国家，以及预期通过部署至任务区内风险更高的区域以获取私人收益的国家，会向此类区域部署更多兵力。相较而言，若国家领导人对高风险承诺所涉潜在成本更为敏感，则该国更不愿向暴力区域派遣现役人员。对1994年至2015年间23项联合国维和任务的空间细分数据分析结果，验证了上述预期。收容任务所在地难民的国家，往往会向当地发生重大暴力事件的区域部署更多兵力。通过参与维和行动为本国军队获取更多收益的国家，也会向此类区域部署更多兵力。相较而言，民主出兵国向暴力区域部署的兵力更少。研究结果还揭示了联合国维和行动内部部队部署的显著差异。