Replication Data for: Bureaucratic politics and aid allocation: Evidence from the U.S. Agency for International Development

We examine the impact of bureaucratic politics within the US Agency for International Development on the allocation of its development assistance. Existing studies of aid allocation have focused on donor interests, recipient needs, and recipient merit without accounting for the bureaucratic decision-making process that helps determine these budgets. We theorize that most field-based development officials seek to maximize their country’s budgets and that better-staffed country offices have greater capacities to do so. We test this theory using novel data on USAID staffing patterns between 1980-2020 and leverage staff rotation patterns using an instrumental variable strategy. Consistent with our theory, results show that increasing the number of USAID staff in a country mission led to substantial increases in aid allocation. We draw on key informant interviews to explore mechanisms underlying this effect. Interviews highlight the close relationships between country-level aid allocation and two country office capacities which better staffing tended to increase: 1) understanding of the USAID budget process and 2) ability to move through time-consuming procedures related to funding commitment and disbursement. The findings have important implications for debates regarding the allocation of development assistance as well as broader discussions on bureaucratic politics in US foreign policy.本研究探讨美国国际开发署（U.S. Agency for International Development，USAID）内部的官僚政治对其发展援助分配的影响。现有援助分配研究多聚焦于捐赠方利益、受援国需求与受援国资质，却未考量对这类预算分配起决定性作用的官僚决策流程。我们提出理论假设：多数外勤发展官员旨在最大化本国的援助预算，而人员配置更充足的国家办事处具备更强的能力达成这一目标。我们采用1980-2020年间USAID人员配置模式的全新数据集检验该理论，并借助工具变量策略，利用人员轮岗模式开展实证分析。研究结果与理论假设一致：提升一国驻该国特派团的USAID人员数量，可大幅增加该地区的援助分配额度。我们借助关键知情人访谈探究该效应背后的作用机制，访谈结果凸显，国家层面的援助分配与两项受人员配置优化提升的国家办事处能力密切相关：1）对USAID预算流程的理解能力；2）完成资金承诺与拨付相关耗时流程的能力。本研究结论对发展援助分配相关辩论，以及美国外交政策中官僚政治的更广范围讨论均具有重要启示意义。