Data for: Gain versus loss contracts: Does contract framing affect agents' reciprocity?

The data set comes from a lab experiment examining the question whether agents' reciprocity toward the principal is negatively affected by loss contracts. First, agents worked on a real effort task under either a gain or a loss contract. Second, principals and agents played a trust game. We find that loss contracts induce more effort and thus a higher payoff for the principal in the real effort task. In contrast, we do not find a spillover effect of contract framing in the trust game. Differences in reciprocity are small in size and not signifficant. The definition of variables is given by the labels.

本数据集源自一项实验室实验，旨在探究代理人（agent）对委托方（principal）的互惠行为是否会因损失合约（loss contract）而受到负面影响。实验分为两个阶段：第一阶段，所有代理人在损失合约或收益合约（gain contract）框架下完成一项真实努力任务（real effort task）；第二阶段，委托方与代理人开展信任博弈（trust game）。研究发现，在真实努力任务中，损失合约框架下的代理人会付出更多努力，进而为委托方带来更高收益。与之相对，我们未观测到合约框架在信任博弈中存在溢出效应（spillover effect）。互惠行为的差异幅度较小，且不具备统计显著性。变量定义已通过标签予以说明。