Replication Data for: Contingent Technocracy: Bureaucratic independence in developing countries

This study investigates the effects of formal bureaucratic independence under varying democratic conditions. Conventional accounts predict that greater formal independence of technocratic agencies facilitates policy implementation, but those claims rest on observations of industrialized, high income countries that are also established democracies. Based on research in developing countries, we argue that the effects of agency independence depend on the political context in which the agency operates. Our empirical subjects are privatization agencies and their efforts to privatize state-owned enterprises in Africa. We predict that greater independence leads to more thorough privatization under authoritarian regimes, but that the effect of independence declines as a country becomes more democratic. Using an original dataset, we examine the relationship between formal agency independence and privatization in Africa from 1990-2007. Our results modify the conventional wisdom on bureaucratic independence and culminate in a more nuanced theory of “contingent technocracy.”本研究考察了不同民主制度语境下正式官僚自主性（formal bureaucratic independence）的作用效应。传统学术主张认为，技术官僚机构（technocratic agencies）的正式自主性越强，越有利于政策执行，但此类论断均依托于对已成熟民主工业化高收入国家的观察样本。基于发展中国家的研究基础，本文提出，官僚机构自主性的作用效果取决于其运行所处的政治情境。本研究的经验分析对象为非洲地区的私有化机构及其推进国有企业私有化的实践活动。我们提出，在威权政权（authoritarian regimes）下，机构自主性越强，私有化进程越彻底；但随着一国民主化水平提升，自主性的正向影响会逐步衰减。本研究利用原创数据集，考察了1990年至2007年间非洲地区官僚机构正式自主性与私有化进程之间的关联。研究结果修正了学界关于官僚自主性的传统共识，并最终构建出更为精细化的“偶发性技术官僚制（contingent technocracy）”理论。