Replication Data for: Divided Government, Strategic Substitution, and Presidential Unilateralism

Presidents select from a range of instruments when creating new policies through executive action. We study strategic substitution in this context and argue that presidents use less visible means of unilateral instruments when Congress is likely to scrutinize presidential action. Using data on unilateral orders issued between 1946 and 2020, we report two main findings. First, analyzing presidents’ choice of instruments, we show that presidents are more likely to substitute memoranda and other less visible instruments for executive orders and proclamations during periods of divided government. Second, after accounting for the substitution of executive orders with other instruments, we find that presidents issue greater numbers of directives during divided government than during unified government. These findings provide new evidence about the limitations of the separation of powers as a constraint on presidential unilateralism and highlight the importance of accounting for the variety of instruments through which presidents create unilateral policies.总统在通过行政行动制定新政策时，可从多种行政工具中进行选择。本研究聚焦于此场景下的战略替代（strategic substitution）现象，提出核心论点：当国会大概率对总统行动进行审议监督时，总统会优先选用透明度更低的单边行政工具（unilateral instruments）。本研究使用1946年至2020年间发布的单边行政令数据，得到两项主要研究发现。其一，通过分析总统对行政工具的选择倾向，研究表明在分治政府（divided government）时期，总统更倾向于以备忘录行政令及其他透明度更低的行政手段，替代行政命令（executive orders）与公告令（proclamations）。其二，在控制行政命令向其他行政工具的替代效应后，研究发现分治政府时期总统发布的行政指令总量，要高于统一政府（unified government）时期。上述研究发现为三权分立（separation of powers）对总统单边行政行动（presidential unilateralism）的约束局限性提供了新的实证证据，同时凸显了纳入总统制定单边政策所使用的各类行政工具进行分析的重要性。