Central Bank Independence in 21 OECD Countries: Panel Dataset, 2010-2020

In the literature, the consensus about the importance of the independence of the central banks towards stable economic growth has been proven (e.g. Barro and Gordon 1983). The empirical papers studying this problem follow Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) central bank independence index which does not include some important factors such as rule of law in the given country and defines the components of independence too generally. In this project, we aim to build an alternative index that will measure the central bank independence in more detail which will account for the rule of law and other relevant aspects that indirectly affect the true independence of the central bank. Obtaining the index, we will study whether the independence of the central bank has a positive effect on maintaining the given central bank's primary target. Furthermore, in this research, we aim to test whether our results differ from the previous findings in the empirical literature on the central bank independence and its effect on stable prices. Based on the obtained results, an optimal legislature of the central bank's independence shall be suggested. This panel dataset provides an assessment of the independence of central banks in 21 OECD countries (excluding the Eurozone), focusing on their monetary policy autonomy as determined by legislation in 2010, 2015, and 2020. Our data collection adopts a novel approach, building upon theinnovating methodology proposed by Cukierman et al. (1992), while incorporating revised components of the index that place greater emphasis on current standards of central bank independence. Additionally, we introduce new criteria to evaluate budgetary independence, an important aspect of central bank autonomy (Swinburne and Castello-Branco, 1991). The dataset serves as a valuable resource for empirical studies seeking to analyze the impact of monetary policy independence on economic performance. Furthermore, policymakers can draw insights from this index to enhance legislative frameworks and promote stronger performance in central bank independence.

学界已就央行独立性（Central Bank Independence）对经济稳定增长的重要性达成共识（例如Barro与Gordon，1983年）。过往研究该议题的实证文献均沿用Cukierman、Webb与Neyapti（1992年）提出的央行独立性指数，但该指数未纳入一国法治水平等关键维度，且对独立性构成要素的界定过于宽泛。本项目旨在构建一套更为精细化的替代性央行独立性指数，将法治水平及其他间接影响央行真实独立性的相关维度纳入考量范畴。在得到该指数后，我们将探究央行独立性是否对实现央行的既定首要目标具有正向作用。此外，本研究还将检验我们的研究结果与现有关于央行独立性及其对物价稳定影响的实证文献结论是否存在差异。基于最终研究结果，我们将提出最优的央行独立性立法框架建议。本面板数据集对21个经合组织（OECD，Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development）国家（不含欧元区）的央行独立性进行评估，重点考察其2010年、2015年及2020年的立法所界定的货币政策自主权。本数据集的收集采用了一种创新性研究路径：在Cukierman等人（1992年）提出的创新性方法论基础上进行拓展，同时对指数的构成要素进行修订，更贴合当前央行独立性的衡量标准。此外，我们还新增了预算独立性的评估标准——这是央行自主权的重要维度（Swinburne与Castello-Branco，1991年）。本数据集可为探究货币政策独立性对经济表现的影响的实证研究提供宝贵的研究资源。此外，政策制定者也可借助该指数优化立法框架，提升央行独立性建设成效。