THE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE AND AUTOMATED SOVEREIGN DISCRETION: RETHINKING THE LIMITS OF DELEGATED JUDGMENT IN THE AGE OF ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE

This article looks at how automated decision-making challenges the non-delegation doctrine which is the core idea that legislatures shouldn’t hand off their law-making power without setting clear limits. By drawing on examples from the United States, India, the European Union, and the UK, the article makes a case: automated systems aren’t just about giving someone else discretion. They shift the power of judgment itself to machines, and that’s a whole new constitutional problem. The article breaks things down into three main questions: What power gets handed over? How much freedom does the system actually have? And do human values stay intact through all this? Basically, for automated systems in government to be truly constitutional, they need to be transparent, accountable, and play fair. As algorithms take on a bigger role in running things, it’s the non-delegation doctrine that still helps us make sense of these issues.