Replication Data for: Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent

Can economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policymakers argue that sanctions can deter state sponsorship, but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that governments are often uncertain if foreign states are truly sponsors versus hosts, and cannot perfectly determine the type of foreign support terrorists are receiving. We argue that this uncertainty, coupled with the proposed strategy of punishing sponsors while cooperating with hosts, creates incentives for sponsors to misrepresent themselves as host states while continuing their support for terrorists. Using a game theoretic model, we demonstrate that in this environment of uncertainty, governments rely on information regarding the state capacity of supporting states to deduce their relationship with terrorists. Consequently, governments are more likely to impose sanctions against foreign states with intermediate levels of state capacity, but are less likely to impose sanctions against failing or stronger states. Our empirical test using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) dataset and the Global Terrorism Data (GTD) provides robust support for this hypothesis.

经济制裁能否有效打击跨国恐怖主义？政策制定者认为，制裁可威慑恐怖主义的国家赞助行为，但针对跨国恐怖主义庇护国的制裁往往适得其反。然而，近期案例显示，各国政府往往难以判定外国政权究竟是恐怖主义的赞助者还是庇护者，也无法精准识别恐怖组织所获外部支持的类型。我们认为，这种信息不确定性，加之学界提出的"惩罚赞助者、同时与庇护者合作"的策略，会激励赞助者将自身伪装为庇护国，同时继续为恐怖组织提供支持。通过构建博弈论模型（game theoretic model），我们证明：在这种信息不对称的环境下，各国政府会借助支持国的国家能力（state capacity）相关信息，推断其与恐怖组织的关联。由此，政府更倾向于对具备中等国家能力的外国政权实施制裁，而对国家能力孱弱或极强的政权则较少动用制裁手段。我们借助制裁威胁与实施数据集（Threat and Imposition of Sanctions, TIES）与全球恐怖主义数据库（Global Terrorism Data, GTD）开展的实证检验，为上述假说提供了稳健的实证支撑。