Replication Data for: \"Turnover: How lame-duck governments disrupt the bureaucracy and service delivery before leaving office\"

Electoral accountability is fundamental to representative democracy. Yet, it can also be costly for governance because it generates turnover among bureaucrats (not just politicians) and disrupts the delivery of public services. Previous studies on the connection between political and bureaucratic turnover emphasize how incoming governments reshape the bureaucracy. This article argues that election losers also engage in bureaucratic shuffling before leaving office, and that this can depress public service delivery. I employ a close-races regression discontinuity design to demonstrate these turnover dynamics, using administrative data on the universe of government employees and healthcare services in Brazilian municipalities. The results show that the incumbent’s electoral defeat causes dismissals of temporary employees, the hiring of more civil servants, and declines in healthcare service delivery before the winner takes office. These findings highlight the political strategies of lame-duck politicians and the consequential bureaucratic politics that follow elections.

选举问责（Electoral accountability）是代议民主的根本基石。然而，选举问责也会为治理带来额外成本：它不仅会引发政客群体的人事更替，更会波及官僚体系，造成官僚人员流动，进而扰乱公共服务的供给。此前针对政治更替与官僚人事更替关联的研究，多聚焦于新一届政府如何重塑官僚体系。本文提出，选举失利者在离任前亦会开展官僚人事洗牌，此举或将削弱公共服务的供给效能。本文采用窄幅选举回归断点设计（close-races regression discontinuity design），结合巴西各市政辖区内全体政府雇员与医疗服务的行政全样本数据，对上述人事流动动态展开实证验证。研究结果显示，在胜选者正式就职前，现任官员的选举失利会导致临时雇员遭解雇、公务员招录规模扩大，同时医疗服务供给出现下滑。本研究结果凸显了跛脚鸭政客的政治策略，以及选举后随之而来的官僚政治后果。