Replication data for: Defense Pacts: A Prescription for Peace?

Do military alliances lead to peace or to war? Research has suggested that defensive alliances to potential targets deter dispute initiation (Leeds 2003b:427). This would seem to suggest that forming defensive alliances is a good policy prescription for those seeking to encourage peace. Yet, some argue that even if defense pacts have a deterrence effect, defense pacts may also have other effects that increase militarized conflict in the international system. Specifically, defense pacts may encourage member states to initiate and/or escalate disputes. In an analysis covering the period from 1816 to 2000, we evaluate these three potential effects of defense pacts—deterrence, initiation, and escalation. We find support for the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes but no evidence in support of the claims that states with defensive allies are more likely to initiate disputes in the international system or that targets with allies are more likely to respond to dispute initiation with further militarization. We conclude that defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in the world.

军事同盟究竟会催生和平，还是引发战争？既有研究表明，针对潜在目标缔结的防御性同盟能够阻遏争端发起（Leeds 2003b:427）。这似乎意味着，对于致力于推动和平的国家而言，组建防御性同盟是一项合理的政策方案。然而，也有观点指出，即便防御条约具备威慑效应，其仍可能通过其他渠道加剧国际体系内的军事化冲突。具体而言，防御条约或会促使成员国发起争端，或是升级既有争端。本研究覆盖1816年至2000年的时段，对防御条约的三类潜在效应——威慑效应、争端发起效应与争端升级效应——进行了检验。研究结果支持了"防御性同盟能够阻遏争端发起"的假说，但未发现证据表明拥有防御盟友的国家更易在国际体系中发起争端，亦未发现证据表明拥有盟友的争端目标更倾向于以进一步的军事化行动回应争端发起。综上，防御性同盟能够降低国际冲突的发生概率，因此对于致力于维护世界和平的国家而言，是一项可取的政策选择。