Replication Data for: Agency Problems in Political Campaigns: Media Buying and Consulting

Advertising expenditures in congressional campaigns are made not directly by campaigns themselves but indirectly though intermediary firms. Using a new dataset of revenues and costs of these firms, we study the markups that these firms charge candidates. We find that markups are higher for inexperienced candidates relative to experienced candidates, and PACs relative to candidates. We also find significant differences across the major parties: firms working for Republicans charge higher prices, exert less effort, and induce less responsiveness in their clients' advertising expenditures to electoral circumstances than do their Democratic counterparts. We connect this observation to the distribution of ideology among individual consulting firm employees, arguing that these higher rents incentivize consultants to work against their intrinsic ideological motivations. The internal organization of firms reflects an attempt to mitigate this conflict of interest; firms are composed of ideologically homogeneous employees, and are more likely to work for ideologically proximate clients.

美国国会竞选活动的广告投放并非由竞选团队直接开展，而是通过中介机构间接完成。本研究依托这类中介机构营收与成本的全新数据集，聚焦分析这些机构向竞选候选人收取的加价率。研究发现，相较于经验丰富的候选人，缺乏竞选经验的候选人面临的加价率更高；相较于候选人客户，政治行动委员会（Political Action Committee, PAC）的加价率同样更高。同时我们还发现两大政党间存在显著差异：为共和党客户服务的中介机构收费更高、投入的工作精力更少，且其客户的广告支出对选举环境变化的响应灵敏度，要低于为民主党客户服务的同类机构。我们将这一现象与咨询机构雇员的意识形态分布关联起来，提出这类更高的经济租会激励顾问违背自身固有的意识形态动机开展工作。这类机构的内部组织架构正是为缓解这一利益冲突所做出的尝试：机构雇员的意识形态高度同质化，且更倾向于承接意识形态理念相近的客户业务。