Replication Data for: Rewarding loyalty: Selective reassurance and enforcement of asymmetric alliances

Great powers frequently signal their alliance commitments during peacetime. While scholars see this peacetime practice as an integral part of great powers’ alliance maintenance, there is significant variation in the intensity of signals that junior allies receive. This article suggests that the choices made by great powers in signalling alliance commitments can be explained by the motivation to encourage compliance among junior allies. Great powers typically form alliances to exert control over their junior allies’ decision-making and thereby maintain their sphere of influence. Yet, great powers may face difficulty in making junior allies accommodate their demands as junior allies’ interests are not always in alignment. This article argues that great powers attempt to maintain their allies’ incentive to comply by reaffirming alliance commitments as an ex-post reward. In addition, to increase the efficiency of this reward strategy, great powers carefully select the targets, taking into account their allies’ willingness to make concessions. Empirical analysis using the sample of United States alliance relationships provides evidence that supports these arguments. This article contributes to the literature by deepening our comprehension of how great powers manage their alliances and providing at least a partial answer to how asymmetric alliances are maintained. Furthermore, this article has important implications for how great powers maintain their status within the international system.

大国通常会在和平时期传递其同盟承诺的信号。尽管学界将这一和平时期的举措视为大国同盟维系工作不可或缺的组成部分，但次级盟国（junior allies）所接收到的信号强度却存在显著差异。本文认为，大国在传递同盟承诺信号时所做出的选择，可通过其激励次级盟国服从的动机加以解释。大国组建同盟的初衷通常是管控次级盟国的决策，以此维护自身势力范围。然而，由于次级盟国的利益并非始终与大国一致，大国往往难以令其顺从自身诉求。本文主张，大国会通过重申同盟承诺作为事后奖励，来维系盟国的服从意愿。此外，为提升这一奖励策略的效率，大国会综合考量盟国的让步意愿，谨慎选择信号传递对象。基于美国同盟关系样本开展的实证分析，为上述论点提供了支撑证据。本文通过深化学界对大国同盟管理逻辑的理解，并至少部分解答了不对称同盟的维系路径，为相关研究领域作出了贡献。此外，本文对于大国如何维系其在国际体系中的地位，亦具有重要的理论与现实启示。