Replication Data for: A Foot Out The Door: What Drives Bureaucratic Exit Into Lobbying Careers?

The revolving door is a potential mechanism of private influence over policy. Recent work primarily examines the revolving of legislators and their staffs, with little focus on the federal bureaucracy. To analyze decisions to turnover into lobbying, we develop an argument emphasizing the (1) policy expertise acquired from federal employment; (2) the proximity of employees to political decision-making; and (3) the agency policymaking environment. Leveraging federal personnel and lobbying data, we find the first two factors predict revolving whereas the policymaking environment has an inconsistent impact. We highlight the importance of studying selection into lobbying for estimating casual effects of lobbyist characteristics on revenue and contribute to the literature on bureaucratic careers and the nature of private influence in policymaking.

旋转门（revolving door）是私营力量影响政策的潜在路径。现有研究主要聚焦于议员及其幕僚的旋转门现象，却极少关注联邦官僚体系中的相关情况。为剖析公职人员转向游说行业的决策逻辑，本文提出一套分析框架，重点关注三大维度：(1) 联邦任职期间积累的政策专业知识；(2) 公职人员与政治决策环节的近距离接触；(3) 所在机构的政策制定环境。通过整合联邦人事数据与游说数据开展实证分析，本文发现前两大因素能够有效预测旋转门现象的发生，而机构政策制定环境的影响则并不稳定。本文强调，剖析游说行业的人员选择机制，有助于准确估计游说者特征对游说收入的因果效应；同时本研究也丰富了官僚职业发展以及政策制定中私营影响力本质的相关学术文献。