(Post) human flourishing : neo-Aristotelian natural rights and the challenge to human nature

The prospect of human genetic modification changing aspects of human nature has led critics to express concern about both human flourishing and universal human rights being undermined by the emergence of so-called ‘posthumans’. Indeed, in opposing such transformative possibilities, some scholars have invoked the authority of traditional ways of thinking about the human in the form of Aristotelian essentialism and the precursor form of human rights, natural rights, that appeals directly to aspects of human nature as a source of value. However, these attempts have tended to be heavily under-theorized and have taken no account of recent scholarly attempts to integrate the two traditions by basing natural rights upon conceptions of human beings as creatures who flourish through pursuit of their supposed ‘natural ends’. On the other hand, the scholars who produced these neoAristotelian rights theories, and who take our extant human nature as the basis for universal rights, have yet to contribute in any substantial way to the human enhancement debate. I aim to fill this theoretical gap by addressing the kinds of freedoms, entitlements and protections that a neo-Aristotelian conception of natural rights might be used to argue for in relation to human genetic modification. Additionally, I address the deeper meta-ethical concern with how such rights theories that are grounded in conceptions of our extant human nature might accommodate both human and posthuman flourishing. Acknowledging the value of a set of natural ends which contribute to human well-being as well as the human trait of practical rationality that allows individuals to decide how to pursue these ends according to their own life plans, I argue that natural rights may protect a moral space for genetic self-modification, though it would impose restrictions on modifying others wherever their prospects for flourishing would seem likely to be harmed. However, my application of neo-Aristotelian natural rights principles does not impose an absolute constraint on genetic modification, and makes some allowance for the introduction of heightened capacities and even novel traits that may be beneficial to human flourishing. I do not, however, endorse the notion of there being positive natural rights to be genetically modified. In addressing how natural rights that claim to have universal applicability could remain relevant in a mixed future environment of humans and posthumans, I argue that the kind of neo-Aristotelian rights theory best equipped to meet this challenge would be one that places emphasis on rational self-direction rather than the realization of a particular set of ends. Despite using a current understanding of natural ends as a guide, I do not argue for the preservation of human nature as such—though I do hold that our natural ends are likely to be very robust and will motivate many ofthe kinds ofmodifications that might take us closer to a posthuman future. Ultimately, I argue, natural rights theory cannot eliminate conflict, though it can continue to speak against oppression and urge the use of practical reason in allowing all rational beings to flourish according to their natures.