Uncertainty, Salient Stakes, and the Causes of Conventional Arms Races

Arms races are costly and inefficient; therefore, standard causal explanations, based on threat perception, are inadequate, as states should prefer to resolve disagreements prior to the onset of these inefficient competitions. Building on recent research, arms races are alternatively conceptualized as a product of uncertainty, used to reveal information. Expectations are derived regarding when arms races should be most likely, allowing for one of the first systematic, quantitative tests of the causes of arms races. Empirical tests support theoretical expectations that arms races are most likely in contexts where there are salient competitive stakes and high levels of uncertainty, such as territorial rivalries or the early tenure of new leaders. The theoretical logic and empirical tests not only produce insights into why states participate in costly and inefficient arms races but also hint at a better understanding of the long puzzling relationship between arms races and war.

军备竞赛（arms races）既耗费高昂又效率低下，因此基于威胁感知（threat perception）的标准因果解释存在局限——各国理应更倾向于在这类低效竞争爆发前就解决分歧。本文借鉴近期前沿研究成果，将军备竞赛重新概念化为不确定性（uncertainty）的产物，其核心作用是传递相关信息。由此，本文推导出军备竞赛高发的情境条件，进而得以开展针对军备竞赛成因的首批系统性定量检验（systematic, quantitative tests）之一。实证检验（empirical tests）结果印证了本文的理论预期：在存在显著竞争利害且不确定性较高的情境中，军备竞赛最易爆发，例如领土对抗（territorial rivalries）或是新领导人执政初期。该理论逻辑与实证检验不仅阐明了各国为何会参与代价高昂且效率低下的军备竞赛，也为破解长期以来困扰学界的军备竞赛与战争间的关联之谜提供了全新视角。