Replication material for: Intersectional representative bureaucracy in Europe

EU citizens hold equal welfare rights across Member States, but national bureaucracies implement these rights unequally. We ask whether representative bureaucracy can reduce this inequality, while considering its intersectional nature. Theoretically, we distinguish additive intersectional representation, where shared traits accumulate, from categorical intersectional representation, where specific identity configurations matter. We show how to test both quantitatively. A conjoint experiment with 2,402 public employees in four Western European countries examines their responses to hypothetical social welfare applicants, varying by age, gender, French or Bulgarian origin and integration effort – traits that can match bureaucrats' own lived experiences. We find that male, Bulgarian and poorly integrated applicants are less likely to be prioritised overall, and that single-trait matches leave priorisation largely unchanged. However, prioritisation rises from 49 to 56 per cent as applicants share up to five traits with bureaucrats. Male Bulgarian applicants benefit specifically when assessed by male bureaucrats with a migration background. Both intersectionality models therefore yield distinct and valuable insights, rather than one being analytically superior to the other. Differentiated implementation of EU social rights thus also arises within administrations, through individual bureaucrats' discretion. Intersectional representative bureaucracy may help address resulting inequities—but policy implications require more investigation.