Replication Data for \"Counterbalancing, Spatial Dependence, and Peer-Group Effects\" (Forthcoming in Political Science Research and Methods)

Previous studies identified several domestic factors that may influence a country’s level of structural coup-proofing, i.e., counterbalancing strategies that shall prevent internal groups from seizing power via a coup d’état. We suggest that a country’s level of counterbalancing is also affected by such policies in what we term countries’ “peer groups.” When deciding the appropriate level of counterbalancing, rulers may be affected by external information flows from a “peer group” with similar structural coup-risk characteristics (institutions) or a similar coup-risk experience (coup history). Using maximum-likelihood spatial-lag models and data in 1976-2005, we find that leaders learn from and emulate counterbalancing in other states, but rather only through an “experiential peer group.”

既往研究已识别出若干可能影响一国结构性防政变（structural coup-proofing）水平的国内因素，即旨在防范内部群体通过政变夺权的制衡策略。本研究提出，一国的制衡策略水平还会受到其所谓“同侪群体”内相关政策的影响。当统治者确定适宜的制衡策略水平时，可能会受到来自“同侪群体”的外部信息流动的影响——这类同侪群体要么具备相似的结构性政变风险特征（即制度环境），要么拥有相似的政变风险经历（即政变历史）。本研究采用1976-2005年的数据集与极大似然空间滞后模型（maximum-likelihood spatial-lag models）开展分析，结果发现：统治者确实会借鉴并效仿他国的制衡策略，但仅会通过“经验型同侪群体”实现这一过程。