Replication Data for: Strategic Delaying and Concessions Extraction in Accession Negotiations to the World Trade Organization, World Trade Review, 12 (4), 2013, pp. 669-692

Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is unlike accession to other global organizations. It is extremely demanding on applicant countries, time consuming and essentially power- rather than rule-based. This article argues that existing WTO members select themselves into the Working Party of applicant countries, the body which determines the timing and conditions of accession, in order to have the option to strategically delay membership by the applicant and/or extract concessions from it. Existing members will select themselves into a specific Working Party if their own trade interests are strongly affected, which will be the case if the existing member’s bilateral trade with the applicant country forms a large share of its income, unless both countries already have a preferential trade agreement (PTA) between them. Trade interests are also strongly affected if the existing member competes with the applicant in terms of export product and market structure. Conversely, where both member and applicant have more PTAs with third countries of large economic size in common, potential accession will affect the member’s trade interests less. An empirical analysis of Working Party membership since 1968 estimates to what extent these three different facets of trade interests are substantively important determinants of Working Party composition.

加入世界贸易组织（World Trade Organization，WTO）与加入其他全球性国际组织截然不同。该进程对申请国要求极高、耗时冗长，且本质上更偏向权力主导而非规则导向。本文提出，现有WTO成员国可自行加入申请国工作组——该机构负责确定加入世贸组织的时间节点与准入条件——以此获得策略性拖延申请国入会进程，或从该国索取让步的选择权。当现有成员国的贸易利益会受到申请国入会的显著影响时，该国便会自行加入对应工作组。而当现有成员国与申请国的双边贸易额在本国贸易收入中占比较高，且两国尚未签订优惠贸易协定（Preferential Trade Agreement，PTA）时，便属于这种情况。若现有成员国与申请国在出口产品结构与市场结构层面存在竞争关系，其贸易利益同样会受到显著影响。反之，若成员国与申请国均与多个大型经济体第三方国家签订了优惠贸易协定，那么申请国的潜在入会对该成员国贸易利益的影响则会相对更小。本文对1968年以来的工作组成员国构成情况展开实证分析，以此评估贸易利益的这三个不同维度，在多大程度上是决定工作组构成的实质性重要影响因素。