Replication data for: Liquid Assets and Fluid Contracts: Explaining the Uneven Effects of Water and Sanitation Privatization

During the neo-liberal reform wave of the 1990s, scores of developing countries privatized infrastructure services such as highways, utilities and ports. This dissertation provides a new theoretical explanation of the varied outcomes of infrastructure privatization in weak institutional environments and an empirical assessment of the argument in the water and sanitation sector. While predominant theoretical explanations of economic growth and investment in regulated industries focus on the ability of institutional configurations and policy design to constrain political and economic actors, the explanation advanced in this dissertation centers on the ability of different types of firms to maintain “relational contracts”—contracts that involve direct negotiation in the face of unforeseen circumstances—with host governments. The theory contends that domestic investors with diverse holdings in the jurisdiction of their contract are better able to maintain bargaining relationships with host governments during periods of economic or political turbulence and when state leverage increases. Such investor s are better able to keep bargaining relationships alive and continue investing during such periods than international investors or domestic firms with more scattered portfolios, because they have greater patience and leverage and can fall back on a broader set of possible exchanges. This dissertation evaluates this argument by examining evidence at two levels of analysis. The first empirical section focuses on the divergent trajectories of fourteen water and sanitation privatizations in Argentina. In these cases, the correlation between diverse local holdings and the long-run viability of private sector management is striking, and process-tracing finds that the mechanisms highlighted by the theory are indeed at work. The second empirical section examines patterns of market entry and exit from the water and sanitation sector in low and middle income countries. Cox proportional hazard regressions find strong associations between domestic investor control over a project, the best available proxy for diversified holdings, and lower rates of premature contract cancellation. The project also finds that international investors have seldom entered new contracts after the Argentine and Asian crises. Moreover, even when not canceling their contracts, multinationals are often attempting to sell shares in existing projects.

在20世纪90年代的新自由主义（neo-liberal）改革浪潮中，众多发展中国家对公路、公用事业（utilities）及港口等基础设施服务实施了私有化。本论文针对制度环境薄弱背景下基础设施私有化的差异化结果提出了全新的理论解释，并就供水与环卫（water and sanitation）领域的相关论点开展了实证评估。尽管针对受规制产业的经济增长与投资的主流理论解释，多聚焦于制度安排与政策设计对政治与经济主体的约束能力，但本论文提出的解释则以不同类型企业与东道国政府维持“关系型契约（relational contracts）”的能力为核心——所谓关系型契约，即指在面临突发状况时需进行直接磋商的契约。该理论认为，在契约管辖辖区内拥有多元化资产组合的本土投资者，在经济或政治动荡时期以及政府议价筹码提升时，更能够维持与东道国政府的议价关系。相较于国际投资者或资产组合更为分散的本土企业，这类投资者在上述时期更能维持议价关系并持续开展投资，原因在于他们拥有更强的耐心与议价筹码，且可依托更广泛的潜在交易渠道。本论文通过两个分析层级的实证证据对该论点进行验证。第一部分实证研究聚焦阿根廷14宗供水与环卫私有化项目的差异化发展路径。在这些案例中，本土多元化资产持有量与私营部门管理的长期存续性之间的关联十分显著，而过程追踪法（process-tracing）的分析结果显示，该理论所强调的机制确实在发挥作用。第二部分实证研究则考察了中低收入国家供水与环卫领域的市场进入与退出模式。通过考克斯比例风险回归模型（Cox proportional hazard regressions）分析，研究发现：对项目拥有控制权的本土投资者（这是衡量多元化资产持有量的最优代理变量）与更低的契约提前终止率之间存在显著关联。本研究还发现，在阿根廷危机与亚洲金融危机之后，国际投资者鲜有新签契约的行为。此外，即便未终止现有契约，跨国企业也往往试图出售其在现存项目中的股权。