CHECKS AND BALANCES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN UZBEKISTAN

This article examines the system of checks and balances as a core principle of public administration and constitutional governance, emphasizing its role in preventing the concentration of power, ensuring accountability, and safeguarding democratic values. Drawing on political theory, comparative constitutional practice, and contemporary administrative challenges, the study analyzes how checks and balances function within classical tripartite government and modern bureaucratic systems. Special attention is given to the transformation of these mechanisms under conditions of technological change, crisis governance, and populist politics. Empirical illustrations are provided through the case of Uzbekistan, where recent administrative and legal reforms demonstrate the practical relevance of institutional oversight, transparency, and judicial review. The article integrates theoretical models of policy error, accountability, and corruption control with real statistical indicators, offering a holistic view of checks and balances as both a normative ideal and an operational tool of governance.本文以权力制衡（checks and balances）作为公共行政与宪政治理的核心原则展开研究，着重阐释其在遏制权力集中、保障问责制（accountability）以及维护民主价值观中的关键作用。本研究依托政治理论、比较宪政治理实践与当代行政挑战议题，剖析权力制衡在经典三权分立政府与现代科层制体系中的运行机制。研究特别关注技术变革、危机治理与民粹主义政治语境下，此类制衡机制所经历的转型过程。本文以乌兹别克斯坦为案例开展实证阐释：该国近期的行政与法治改革，彰显了制度监督、透明度与司法审查（judicial review）的实践意义。本文将政策失误、问责制与腐败治理的理论模型与真实统计指标相结合，全面呈现了权力制衡作为规范性理想与治理实操工具的双重属性。