Replication Data for: The Timing of Public Policies: Political Budget Cycles and Credit Claiming

Why do politicians cluster the distribution of benefits in the run-up to elections? I suggest that credit claiming is an explanation for political budget cycles. Brazilian rules banning credit claiming before elections while allowing the distribution of benefits until election day provide an opportunity to differentiate between distribution and credit claiming combined with distribution as an engine that reinforces political budget cycles. Evidence from housing and conditional-cash transfer programs demonstrates that officials expand these programs before the credit-claiming ban and halt expansion after the ban yet prior to election day. Drawing on social media and qualitative data, I show that politicians use credit claiming to convey information about their competence and attribution. Distribution without attribution reduces the likelihood of political budget cycles compared to distribution with attribution, which together reinforces preelection expansion of policy benefits. I rule out rival explanations of clientelism and party favoritism.

为何政客会在选举前夕集中发放福利补贴？本文提出，政绩宣称（credit claiming）是政治预算周期（political budget cycles）的一项核心解释动因。巴西相关法规禁止选举前开展政绩宣称，但允许在选举当日之前发放福利补贴，这为区分「单纯福利发放」与「结合政绩宣称的福利发放」这两类强化政治预算周期的驱动机制提供了绝佳研究契机。来自住房项目与有条件现金转移支付项目的实证证据显示，官员会在政绩宣称禁令生效前扩大此类项目的实施规模，并在禁令生效后、选举日前停止扩张。借助社交媒体与质性研究数据，本文证实政客通过政绩宣称来传递自身执政能力与归因（attribution）策略的相关信息。相较于伴随归因的福利发放模式，无归因的福利发放会降低政治预算周期出现的可能性，二者共同推动了选举前政策福利的扩张。本文还排除了庇护主义（clientelism）与政党偏袒（party favoritism）这两种竞争性解释路径。