Replication data for: Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on the Democratic Initiation of Conflict

How do domestic political institutions affect the propensity to initiate international conflict? We improve theoretical understanding of and empirical knowledge on this question. We describe three major types of democratic institutional characteristics that have been hypothesized to increase the constraints on conflict initiation: public electoral participation, intra-legislative factors, and a stronger legislature in relation to the executive. Using a Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) model to analyze 37 democracies in the period 1919-1992, we find that higher political participation levels decrease the likelihood of initiating an international dispute and that neither the number of parties nor the nature of the ruling coalition affects the likelihood of initiating a dispute. The evidence is mixed on whether variation in executive-legislative constraints makes initiation more likely. These findings highlight the significance of public consent for the formation of democratic foreign policy.

国内政治制度如何影响一国发起国际冲突的倾向？本研究增进了学界对该问题的理论理解与实证认知。我们梳理了三类被假说可强化冲突发起约束的民主制度特征：公众选举参与、立法机构内部因素，以及相较于行政部门更为强势的立法机构。本研究采用广义估计方程（Generalized Estimating Equations, GEE）模型，对1919年至1992年间的37个民主国家进行分析，结果发现：更高的政治参与水平会降低一国发起国际争端的概率；而政党数量与执政联盟性质均不会对争端发起概率产生显著影响。关于行政-立法约束的变化是否会提升冲突发起概率，现有实证结果并不一致。上述研究结果凸显了公众认同在民主国家外交政策制定中的重要意义。