ЧАСТНОПРАВОВЫЕ АКТЫ, ФАКТЫ И ЮРИДИЧЕСКИЕ КОНСТРУКЦИИ: НЕКОТОРЫЕ МЕТОДОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ЗАМЕЧАНИЯ

The article presents a methodological analysis of how private-law acts and facts function within legal constructions, arguing that legal facts are normative, teleologically explainable elements of subjective legal reality that must be distinguished from both natural facts and the constructions in which they operate.The author begins by distinguishing scientific “facts” as forms of empirical knowledge from legal facts as circumstances recognized by the legal order as grounds for legal consequences. It is emphasized that descriptive reality and normative prescriptions are not causally connected, so the truth of a norm cannot be derived from life circumstances, which necessitates rethinking traditional views on legal acts and facts.Legal facts are described as normative constructs whose model features are fixed in the hypothesis of a legal norm, while a norm itself appears as a statement describing permitted or prohibited behaviour and its consequences. The logical implication between hypothesis and disposition is not identical to the link that legal actors perceive between an actual event and ensuing legal consequences; that link arises from the nature of the norm rather than from causality.To explain why certain events function as grounds for legal consequences, the article invokes the notion of a “practical syllogism”, where the major premise expresses the goal, the minor premise connects an action to that goal, and the conclusion describes the resulting legal situation.This provides a teleological rather than purely causal model of explanation, aligning legal reasoning with purposive action and showing that the “cause” of a legal fact lies in the legal result (causa facti) it is meant to achieve.A key distinction is drawn between acts as volitional behaviours aimed at a legally protected result and facts as broader, sometimes non-volitional circumstances, both serving as central elements of legal constructions. Private-law acts (especially dispositive acts) are analyzed as outward manifestations of legally relevant will, whose interpretation must proceed via the structure and effects of the underlying juridical construction (such as a contract), not via psychological introspection.The article uses the doctrine of dispositive acts to clarify how transfer of property rights operates in causal systems, separating the obligation-creating contract from the act realizing the transfer. It argues that ignoring the autonomy of dispositive acts undermines the absolute effect of subjective rights and leads to conceptual errors in classifying contracts and understanding derivative versus original acquisition of ownership and good faith possession.Non-volitional facts, such as events or circumstances beyond a party’s control, are treated as mere preconditions that require a presupposed or expressed will to ground subjective rights. The article concludes that legal facts are forms of empirical knowledge about circumstances to which norms attach legal consequences; they belong to subjective reality, function as central nodes within legal constructions, and must not be conflated with those constructions themselves.本文对私法行为（private-law acts）与事实在法律构造（legal constructions）中的运行机理展开方法论分析，主张法律事实（legal facts）是主观法律实在（subjective legal reality）中具有规范性、可作目的论解释的要素，须将其与自然事实（natural facts）及其所嵌入的法律构造加以区分。 作者首先将作为经验性认知（empirical knowledge）形式的科学"事实"，与法律秩序（legal order）认可为法律后果（legal consequences）依据的法律事实加以区分。需强调的是，描述性实在（descriptive reality）与规范性规定（normative prescriptions）之间不存在因果关联（causal connection），因此无法从生活事实推导规范的有效性，这要求我们重新审视关于法律行为与法律事实的传统观点。 法律事实被界定为规范性构造，其模型特征固定于法律规范（legal norm）的假定要件（hypothesis）之中；而法律规范本身则是表述允许或禁止行为及其后果的陈述。假定要件与法律后果之间的逻辑蕴含关系（logical implication），并不等同于法律主体所认知的实际事件与随之产生的法律后果之间的关联——此种关联源自规范的性质，而非因果关系。 为阐释为何特定事件可充任法律后果的依据，本文引入"实践三段论（practical syllogism）"概念：大前提（major premise）表述目的，小前提（minor premise）将行为与该目的相联结，结论则描述由此产生的法律状态。此种解释模式属于目的论而非纯粹因果论，使法律推理与目的性行动相契合，并表明法律事实的"原因"在于其旨在实现的法律结果（即causa facti[事实原因]）。 本文还对两类核心要素作出关键区分：一类是以达成受法律保护的结果为目标的意志性行为（volitional behaviours），另一类是范围更广、有时不具有意志性的事实，二者均为法律构造的核心组成部分。私法行为（尤其是处分行为（dispositive acts））被分析为具有法律意义的意志的外在表现，对其的解释须依托相关基础性法律构造（juridical construction，如合同）的结构与效力，而非借助心理内省（psychological introspection）。 本文借助处分行为理论，阐明财产权利移转在因果关系体系中的运行逻辑，将创设债权的合同（obligation-creating contract）与实现权利移转的处分行为相分离。文章主张，忽视处分行为的独立性会损害主观权利（subjective rights）的绝对效力，并会在合同分类、理解所有权（ownership）继受取得（derivative acquisition）与原始取得（original acquisition）以及善意占有（good faith possession）等问题上引发概念谬误。 不具有意志性的事实（如当事人无法控制的事件或情势）仅被视为前提条件，其须依托预设或明示的意志方能成为主观权利的依据。本文最终得出结论：法律事实是对各类情势的经验性认知，而规范将法律后果附着于此类情势之上；法律事实属于主观法律实在，在法律构造中发挥核心节点的功能，且绝不能与其所嵌入的法律构造本身相混淆。