Replication data for: The Motion to Recommit in the U.S. House of Representatives

The motion to recommit (MTR), a procedure sometimes used in the House, is the subject of recent debate, regarding whether the motion undermines the majority party’s ability to manipulate outcomes in the House (Krehbiel and Meirowitz 2002; Kiewiet and Roust chapter 20; Wolfensberger 2003; Roberts 2004). Most works in this debate suggest at least implicitly that the ability to use the motion confers some advantage on the minority party that it would not otherwise enjoy. Some of these works treat MTR’s primarily as dependent variables whose use is to be explained (Wolfe nsberger 1991, 2003; Roberts 2004). Consequently, they are heavy on analysis of the minority’s ability to offer (successful) recommital motions; for the most part, however, they imply that the ability to offer MTR’s benefits the minority party, without spelling out the nature of the benefit. Krehbiel and Meirowitz (2003) are an exception, arguing explicitly that the benefit that the minority party gains via MTR’s is the ability to exert significant influence upon the shape of legislative d ecisions. To the extent that these studies of the motion’s significance find that it weakens the majority party, they rely largely on theoretical arguments and anecdotal evidence to back up their claims. We examine various data in a more rigorous empirical evaluation than has heretofore been conducted of hypotheses following from the view that the MTR empowers the minority party to affect policy.1 We show that these predictions are at sharp odds with observed behavior, suggestin g that the MTR does not undermine the majority party as has been argued.

交付复议动议（Motion to Recommit, MTR）是美国众议院偶尔使用的一项议事程序，近期学界围绕该动议是否会削弱多数党操控众议院议事结果的能力展开了广泛争论（Krehbiel与Meirowitz，2002；Kiewiet与Roust，第2章；Wolfensberger，2003；Roberts，2004）。本次争论中的多数研究至少暗含一个观点：使用该动议的能力能够为少数党带来其原本无法获得的竞争优势。其中部分研究将交付复议动议的使用主要作为需被解释的因变量（Wolfensberger，1991、2003；Roberts，2004）。因此，这类研究着重分析少数党提出（成功的）交付复议动议的能力；但在大多数情况下，这些研究仅暗示提出交付复议动议的能力对少数党有利，却未阐明该优势的具体内涵。Krehbiel与Meirowitz（2003）则是例外，他们明确提出，少数党通过交付复议动议获得的优势，是能够对立法决策的走向施加显著影响。在那些认为交付复议动议会削弱多数党的相关研究中，其结论大多仅依赖理论论证与轶事证据作为支撑。本文针对“交付复议动议能够赋予少数党影响政策走向的权力”这一观点所衍生的各类假说，采用比此前研究更为严谨的实证分析方法，对多类数据展开检验¹。研究结果显示，上述理论预测与实际观测到的议事行为存在显著冲突，表明交付复议动议并未如此前所言那样削弱多数党的地位。