Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification

Retrospective voting models assume that offering more information to voters about their incumbents’ performance strengthens electoral accountability. However, it is unclear whether incumbent corruption information translates into higher political participation and increased support for challengers. We provide experimental evidence that such information not only decreases incumbent party support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout and support for the challenger party, as well as erodes partisan attachments. While information clearly is necessary to improve accountability, corruption information is not sufficient because voters may respond to it by withdrawing from the political process. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for studies of voting behavior.

回顾性投票模型（Retrospective voting models）假定，向选民提供更多关于在任公职人员履职表现的信息，可强化选举问责机制。然而，目前尚无定论：在任官员的腐败信息是否能够转化为更高的政治参与度，以及对挑战者政党的更多支持。本研究通过实验证据表明，此类信息不仅会削弱墨西哥地方选举中执政党的支持率，还会降低选民投票率与对挑战者政党的支持度，同时侵蚀选民的党派依附感。尽管提升选举问责效能显然需要相关信息，但腐败相关信息本身并不足以达成目标——选民可能会因此选择退出政治参与进程。最后，我们就本研究发现对投票行为研究的启示展开了讨论。