Data for: Corrupt governments do not receive more state-to-state aid: Governance and the delivery of foreign aid through non-state actors
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http://doi.org/10.17632/2tskmk7sdg.1
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Abstract of associated article: A core result of the aid allocation literature is that the quality of governance in recipient countries does not affect the amounts of foreign aid received. Donor countries may still give aid to poorly-governed countries because of a dilemma they face: those countries most in need typically also lack proper institutions. This paper argues that donors try to resolve this dilemma by delivering aid through non-state actors. Using aid shares as well as absolute amounts of aid allocated through state and non-state channels and considering different dimensions of governance, we provide evidence that bypassing governments via NGOs and multilateral organizations is indeed a response to weak recipient state institutions. The effect is stronger in aid sectors where donors can more easily switch between channels, and weaker for higher levels of economic self-interest among donors.
相关论文摘要:援助分配文献的核心结论指出,受援国治理质量不影响其收到的援助金额。捐赠国可能会因面临困境而向治理不佳的国家提供援助:那些最需要援助的国家通常也缺乏适当的机构。本文认为,捐赠国试图通过向非国家行为者提供援助来解决这个问题。通过分析通过国家和非国家渠道分配的援助份额以及援助的绝对金额,并考虑治理的不同维度,我们提供了证据,表明通过非政府组织和多边机构绕过政府确实是应对受援国国家机构薄弱的一种策略。这种影响在捐赠国可以更轻松地在不同渠道间切换的援助领域更为显著,而在捐赠国经济自利程度较高的领域则较弱。
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