Replication Data for: Constructive and Destructive Legislative Review: The Government-Opposition Divide in Parliamentary Oversight

There is growing interest in the policy impact of legislatures in parliamentary systems. While scholars have shown that coalition parties rely on legislative amendments to police deviations from the coalition compromise, there are notable gaps in our understanding of legislative review, most importantly, regarding the substance of amendments. Introducing the concepts constructive and destructive legislative review, we identify distinct patterns of legislative review by government and opposition parties. Based on the notion of collective cabinet responsibility, we argue that coalition parties are bound by informal rules that limit them to the labor-intensive redrafting of bills (constructive review). Conversely, opposition parties take a low-cost approach by proposing to strike out bill sections (destructive review). We provide empirical support for our hypotheses by analyzing an original dataset of counterfactual bills from a German state legislature. The results improve our understanding of opposition strategies in legislative review and control mechanisms within coalition governments.

学界对议会制国家立法机构的政策影响愈发关注。尽管已有学者证实，联合政党依靠立法修正案来监督对联合妥协方案的偏离行为，但学界对立法审查的认知仍存在显著研究空白，其中尤以修正案的实质内容维度最为突出。本研究提出建设性立法审查（constructive legislative review）与破坏性立法审查（destructive legislative review）两个核心概念，借此识别执政党与反对党在立法审查中的差异化行为模式。基于集体内阁责任（collective cabinet responsibility）的理念，本研究指出：联合政党受非正式规则约束，仅能采取劳动密集型的法案重写方式开展审查（即建设性审查）。与之相对，反对党则采用低成本策略，通过提议删除法案条款的方式进行立法审查（即破坏性审查）。本研究通过分析来自德国某州议会的原创反事实法案数据集，为本文提出的研究假设提供了实证支撑。研究结果有助于深化学界对立法审查中反对党策略以及联合政府内部管控机制的理解。