Bureaucrat Assignments as Instruments of Political Control: Evidence from Land Administration Officials in India

This paper investigates how politicians use personnel policy to control, and sometimes corrupt, bureaucratic behavior, focusing on the assignment of bureaucrats to geographical posts. With a matching model, we show that when posts vary in desirability, politicians can use assignments as carrots/sticks to control bureaucrats even when they cannot be fired. The argument is tested with a nationwide survey of Indian officials who regulate/administer land, a lucrative asset and source of political rents in fast-growing countries. With a novel design, we show that officials prefer posts with urban amenities, good staffing, and hometown proximity. These preferences are intense in salary-equivalent terms. Ruling parties pressure officials to bend regulations by strategically assigning them to their preferred posts but threatening transfer should they fail to comply, especially in locations with high corruption potential (volume of rural-to-urban land transactions). The findings highlight bureaucrat assignments as a potent instrument of political control/corruption of bureaucracy.本研究探讨政客如何借助人事政策管控官僚行为，乃至有时滋生腐败，并聚焦于官僚的地理岗位分配问题。借助匹配模型（matching model），我们证明，若不同岗位的吸引力存在差异，即便政客无法解雇官僚，仍可通过岗位分配作为奖惩手段对其实施管控。本研究的论证通过一项针对印度土地监管官员的全国性调查得以检验——在快速发展的国家中，土地是极具盈利性的资产，也是政治租金（political rents）的重要来源。借助新颖的研究设计，我们发现官员更青睐具备城市配套设施、充足人员配置且临近家乡的岗位。从薪资等效的角度来看，这类偏好的强度极高。执政党会通过策略性地将官员分配至其心仪岗位，并以岗位调动相威胁，迫使官员违反监管规定；在腐败风险较高（即城乡土地交易规模较大）的地区，这种施压行为尤为突出。研究结果表明，官僚岗位分配是实现政治管控乃至官僚体系腐败的有力工具。