Data for: Pay, peek, punish? Repayment, information acquisition and punishment in a microcredit lab-in-the-field experiment

Abstract of associated article: Despite remarkable repayment rates in microcredit group lending, anecdotal evidence from the field suggests that there is excessive punishment among group members. To quantify excessive peer punishment, I conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with actual microcredit borrowers in rural India. I design a repayment coordination game with strategic default and the possibility of acquiring information about a peer's investment return (peer peeking) and of sanctioning a peer (peer punishment). I observe loan repayment of over 90% and punishment of around 85%. Punishment is classified as excessive compared to a game-theoretically derived benchmark of zero punishment and a behaviorally-rooted benchmark of unjust punishment. This gives solid support to the anecdotal evidence and manifests the concern of excessive peer pressure in microcredit group lending. The most promising explanation is that borrowers have internalized the mission indoctrination of the microlender of what constitutes a good borrower, namely repaying loans and disciplining peers.

相关论文摘要：尽管小额信贷团体贷款（microcredit group lending）的还款率表现优异，但来自实践一线的轶事证据显示，团体成员间存在过度惩罚现象。为量化同伴过度惩罚问题，本文针对印度农村的真实小额信贷借款人开展了实验室实地实验（lab-in-the-field experiment）。本文设计了一款还款协调博弈实验，涵盖策略性违约、获取同伴投资回报信息（即“同伴窥探”，peer peeking）以及对同伴实施制裁（即“同伴惩罚”，peer punishment）三种核心设定。实验结果显示，整体贷款还款率超过90%，惩罚率约为85%。相较于博弈论推导得出的“零惩罚”基准，以及基于行为逻辑的“非公正惩罚”基准，本次观测到的惩罚行为被判定为过度。这一发现为一线轶事证据提供了坚实支撑，也印证了小额信贷团体贷款中同伴压力过度的潜在担忧。最具说服力的解释为：借款人已将小额信贷机构所灌输的“合格借款人标准”内化于心，即按时偿还贷款并约束同伴行为。