The Moderating Effect of Democracy on Climate-Induced Social Conflict: Evidence from Indian Districts

Do political institutions moderate the effect of environmental stress on social conflict? We posit that while the frequency of social conflict in developing agrarian states can increase during drought, democratic competition reduces conflict and can facilitate cooperation, reversing this effect. This hypothesis is tested on a sample of all districts in India over a period from 2001–2014. The de- pendent variable captures the number of crimes perpetrated against scheduled castes – so-called “untouchables”– and scheduled tribes – India’s indigenous groups – during a given district-year. When the effect of drought is moderated using a local electoral competition index, findings show that although droughts increase the frequency of social conflicts where political institutions are weak, they reduce it where political institutions are strong. The results are robust to alternative operationalization choices. Our findings thus have relevance both to scholars of the climate-conflict nexus and to policymakers working to address climate change’s effects.

政治制度是否会调节环境压力对社会冲突的效应？我们提出如下假设：尽管发展中农业国家的社会冲突发生频率会在干旱时期上升，但民主竞争能够抑制冲突并促进合作，从而逆转这一效应。本研究以2001年至2014年间印度所有县为样本，对该假设进行检验。因变量（dependent variable）为特定县-年度内，针对在册种姓（Scheduled Castes，即所谓“不可接触者”）与在册部落（Scheduled Tribes，印度原住民群体）实施的犯罪数量。当使用地方选举竞争指数对干旱的效应进行调节分析时，研究结果显示：在政治制度薄弱的地区，干旱会加剧社会冲突的发生频率；而在政治制度健全的地区，干旱则会降低社会冲突的发生频率。该研究结果在多种替代操作化方案下均保持稳健。因此，本研究结论既对气候-冲突关联（climate-conflict nexus）领域的学者具有参考价值，也可为致力于应对气候变化影响的政策制定者提供借鉴。