Reconstructing the Hydra-Headed Monster: The Bank of the United States, Institutional Change, and American Constitutional Development

This dissertation is a study of American constitutional development inspired by suspect constitutional historiography. When scholars recount the constitutional controversy surrounding the Bank of the United States (1791-1811; 1816-1836), they tend overwhelmingly to outline a two-sided, multi-generational, and inter-branch struggle over the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. In truth, combatants also (1) fundamentally reconstructed that clause over time, and (2) brought a second provision — the congressional power to “Coin Money, Regulate the Value Thereof” — within the national bank’s constitutional ambit. Both of these traditionally ignored constitutional constructions were inspired by gradual but transformative institutional change between 1791 and 1811. These change-induced constitutional constructions met disparate long-run fates — the first never captured the collective imagination of federal lawmakers or Supreme Court justices, while the second effectively altered constitutional meaning between 1816 and 1832 — and this divergence generates a developmental puzzle: Under what conditions will gradual but transformative institutional change lead to constitutional development? This dissertation argues that adjustments to authoritative textual meaning will follow slow-moving institutional change when (1) actors respond to the latter by reconstructing constitutional provisions, and (2) those constructions are offered in the service of achieving policy outcomes with broadly-distributed benefits. It also considers (but rejects) a rival claim that constitutional change will follow institutional change when (1) actors respond to the latter with novel constructions of existing text, and (2) those constructions draw constitutional meaning closer to that intended by the Founding generation.

本论文是以受学界质疑的宪法史学叙事为研究视角，开展的美国宪法发展研究。当学者们梳理围绕美国合众国银行（1791-1811年；1816-1836年）的宪法争议时，绝大多数情况下都会围绕必要与适当条款（Necessary and Proper Clause）的内涵，勾勒出一场双面性、跨多代且横跨政府分支的斗争图景。但实际上，争议双方还完成了两项核心工作：其一，随着时间推移对该条款进行了根本性重构；其二，将第二项宪法条款——即国会"Coin Money, Regulate the Value Thereof"的权力——纳入合众国银行的宪法管辖范畴。这两项长期被学界忽视的宪法建构，均源自1791年至1811年间渐进却具有变革性的制度变迁。这两项由制度变迁催生的宪法建构，最终走向了截然不同的长期命运：前者从未获得联邦立法者与联邦最高法院大法官的集体认可，后者则在1816年至1832年间切实改变了宪法内涵。这种命运分歧引出了一个发展谜题：渐进却具有变革性的制度变迁，在何种条件下会推动宪法发展？本论文提出，当满足以下两个条件时，渐进的制度变迁将推动权威文本内涵的调整：其一，行为主体通过重构宪法条款回应制度变迁；其二，此类宪法建构服务于实现惠及广泛群体的政策目标。本论文同时考察了一项对立主张（但最终予以驳斥）：该主张认为，当满足以下两个条件时，制度变迁将催生宪法变革：其一，行为主体通过对现有文本进行创新性建构回应制度变迁；其二，此类建构使宪法内涵更贴近建国一代的原初意图。