Replication Data for: Geographically-Targeted Spending in Mixed-Member Majoritarian Electoral Systems

Can governments elected under mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral systems use geographically-targeted spending to increase their chances of staying in office and if so, how? Despite its use in twenty eight countries around the world today, little research has addressed this question. We explain how MMM's combination of electoral rules and unlinked tiers creates a distinct strategic environment in which a large and small party can trade votes in one tier for votes in the other tier in a way that increases the number of seats won by both. Once in government, we explain how parties dependent on vote trading can use geographically-targeted spending to cement it. We test our propositions using original data from Japan (2003-2013) and Mexico (2012-2016). In both cases, we find that municipalities in which supporters split their ballots as instructed received more money after elections. Our findings have broad implications for research on MMM, distributive politics, and the politics of Japan and Mexico, respectively.

在混合制多数选举制（mixed-member majoritarian, MMM）下当选的政府，能否通过地理定向支出来提升连任概率？若可行，具体路径为何？尽管当前全球已有28个国家采用该选举制度，但鲜有研究涉及这一议题。我们阐释了混合制多数选举制的选举规则与互不关联的选区层级相结合，如何塑造出独特的战略环境：在此环境中，大型政党与小型政党可在不同选举层级间开展选票交易，以此提升双方斩获的席位总数。一旦成功执政，我们进一步阐释了依赖选票交易的政党，可如何借助地理定向支出来巩固执政地位。我们利用日本（2003-2013年）与墨西哥（2012-2016年）的原创数据对所提出的命题进行检验。两类案例的研究结果均显示，选民按照指示拆分选票的市级行政区，在选举后获得了更多定向财政拨款。本研究分别对混合制多数选举制研究、分配政治研究，以及日本与墨西哥的国内政治研究具有广泛的启示意义。