Replication data for: A Checkpoint Effect? Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Travel Restrictions in the West Bank.

Does non-violent repression prompt subject groups to obey or rebel? By what mechanism does it do so? To address these questions we exploit a natural experiment based on a 2009 policy towards the easement of checkpoints as non-violent impediments to movement in the West Bank. We sample populations across 17 villages (n=599), beside one checkpoint slated for easement (treatment) and one that will undergo no change (control), before and after the intervention. We then pursue difference-in-difference estimation. This design is experimental, as easement was orthogonal to Palestinian attitudes; for robustness, we test our findings against an independent panel (n=1200). We find that easement makes subject populations less likely to support violence; we suggest humiliation as the mechanism bridging non-violent repression with militancy. This warrants rethinking Israeli security policy, as short-term concerns over Palestinian mobility may be compromising Israel's long-term interests. By extension, checkpoint easement may positively affect peace negotiations

非暴力压制会促使受管控群体选择服从还是反抗？其背后的作用机制是什么？为解答上述问题，本研究依托2009年约旦河西岸地区一项放宽检查站限制的政策展开自然实验——此类检查站属于限制人员流动的非暴力阻碍手段。研究在干预前后分别对17个村庄的人群开展抽样调查（总样本量n=599），其中一组毗邻计划放宽管控的检查站（处理组），另一组毗邻无政策变动的检查站（对照组），随后采用双重差分法进行估计。本实验设计符合实验研究规范，因检查站放宽政策与巴勒斯坦民众态度不存在相关性；为确保研究结果的稳健性，我们还利用独立面板数据（n=1200）对研究发现进行了验证。研究结果显示，放宽检查站管控会降低受影响群体对暴力行为的支持意愿；我们提出，屈辱感是连接非暴力压制与激进行为的核心机制。该研究结论或需重新审视以色列的安全政策：短期而言，对巴勒斯坦人员流动的管控顾虑，可能正在损害以色列的长期国家利益。进一步而言，放宽检查站限制或可对和平谈判产生积极影响。